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ABSTRACT: 
The OECD’s ‘Unified Approach’ (UA) features new taxing rights allocated to market 
jurisdictions irrespective of the existence of physical presence. While this new taxing 
right is intended to address tax challenges of a new economic pattern, i.e. the 
digitalisation of the economy, these authors note that similar challenges already 
existed even before the era of digitalisation, particularly with respect to the attribution 
of profit to the dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE). The authorized 
OECD approach (AOA), which hinges the profit attributable to a DAPE upon the 
significant people function performed by the dependent agent (DA), has been heavily 
criticized. In this regard, the UA provides a more reasonable and simplified solution: 
the source state is entitled to tax at least a portion of the residual profit made by the 
non-resident enterprise from the business undertaken in that state through the DAPE 
regardless of the extent of the functions performed by the DA enterprise. This 
approach has indeed already been implemented by certain countries in their domestic 
tax practices regarding the DAPE profit attribution, albeit couched in traditional 
transfer-pricing terms. At the same time, these domestic tax practices on the DAPE 
profit attribution may enlighten the improvement to the UA that has been criticized 
for its complexity and uncertainty.      
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since October 2019, the OECD has developed a ‘Unified Approach’ (UA) under 
Pillar One, which concerns the allocation of taxing rights between jurisdictions in the 
context of digitalisation.1 The UA features a ‘new taxing right’, i.e. taxing rights 
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allocated to market jurisdictions irrespective of the existence of physical presence.2 
The label of ‘new’ taxing right suggests that this novel approach targets the tax 
challenge of a new economic paradigm, i.e. the digitalisation of the economy, 
particularly with respect to the phenomenon of ‘scale without mass’.3  
These authors, however, take the view that the traditional fiscal world in the absence 
of the digital economy has already been frequented and many times disturbed by scale 
without mass. This issue is most notably reflected in the debate on the attribution of 
profit to the dependent agent permanent establishment (DAPE), a situation in which a 
non-resident taxpayer has no physical presence of his own in a source state, and his 
business in that country is typically outsourced to a local enterprise in the country.4 
The authorized OECD approach (AOA) hinges the profit attributable to a DAPE upon 
the significant people function performed by the DA enterprise, a method that has 
caused much confusion.5 In this connection, these authors will strive to demonstrate 
how the new taxing right under the UA may enlighten the DAPE’s profit attribution as 
well as the entire AOA, which has been heavily criticized for its complexity and lack 
of coherence.6 Indeed, as will be demonstrated in a later section, some domestic 
courts have already acknowledged, albeit in an unconscious and indirect manner, the 
rights of source states to tax non-resident enterprises with DAPEs within those states 
regardless of the function performed by the DAs.7 In this sense, both scale without 
mass and the new taxing right endorsed by the UA are rather ‘old wine in a new 
bottle’. At the same time, the domestic legal practice on DAPE profit attribution may 
also provide some useful insights to the refinement of the UA that has also been 
increasingly under criticism.8 Accordingly, the mutual enlightenment between the UA 
and the discussion on DAPE profit attribution is at the heart of this article.  
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In what follows, an outline of the UA and the AOA will be laid out in Sections 2 and 3, 
respectively. Part 4 contains a critical analysis of the AOA to the profit attribution for 
the DAPE followed by a proposed solution informed by the UA. The part is 
concluded by a case study. Part 5 provides some critical comments on the UA, 
drawing on the insights from domestic practice on DAPE profit attribution. Part 6 
concludes. 
2. OUTLINE OF THE UA 
The UA seeks to build a consensus-based approach that is based on various previous 
recommendations, which can be grouped into three major proposals: the ‘user 
participation’ proposal, the ‘marketing intangibles’ proposal, and the ‘significant 
economic presence’ proposal.9 In particular, the UA highlights a commonality of all 
of the three proposals, i.e. the acknowledgement that a market jurisdiction is entitled a 
taxing right no matter whether there is a physical presence within this jurisdiction.10 
Nonetheless, the UA is only applicable to in-scope businesses, i.e. automated digital 
services and consumer-facing businesses.11   
The UA identifies three types of taxable profit that may be allocated to a market 
jurisdiction described as Amount A, Amount B, and Amount C, respectively. 
Amount A: A share of residual profit allocated to market jurisdictions irrespective of 
the existence of physical presence. This amount is derived by using a formulaic 
approach applied at a multinational enterprise (MNE) or business line level.12 The 
so-called residual profit is the profit that would remain after allocating arm’s length 
remuneration to all routine activities performed in relation to the business 
concerned.13 
Amount B: A fixed remuneration based on the arm’s length principle for baseline 
distribution and marketing functions that occur in the market jurisdiction.14  
Amount C: Any additional profit for in-country functions that exceed the baseline 
activity covered by Amount B.15 
                                                        
9 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 3 (para. 4). 
10 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 4 (paras 7, 10). 
11 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 7 (paras 19, 20). 
12 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 6 (para. 15). 
13 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 9 (para. 30). 
14 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 6 (para. 15). 
15 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 9 (para. 30). 
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As the UA recognizes, Amounts B and C are based on the existing transfer pricing 
(TP) rules.16 Only Amount A embodies the aforementioned new taxing right, and 
there are nexus requirements for its application. Specifically, for automated digital 
businesses, the revenue threshold will be the only test required to create nexus. For 
consumer-facing businesses, nexus showing a sustained interaction with the market 
jurisdiction by the MNE is further required in addition to the revenue threshold.17 
This scope limitation reinforces the impression that the new taxing right is only 
intended for the new economic paradigm. 
The UA further recognizes that a strong emphasis on dispute prevention and 
resolution is integral to each of the above three amounts. 18  An improved 
dispute-resolution process is of particular relevance for the determination of Amounts 
A and C, both of which may ‘eat into’ the profit of non-routine activities related to the 
business and hence overlap with each other.19 
3. OUTLINE OF THE AOA  
Pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD Model, the basic principle of allocating tax 
rights over business income between contracting states works as follows: unless a 
non-resident enterprise has a permanent establishment (PE) in the host country, the 
business profit of that enterprise may not be taxed by the host country.20 Conversely, 
once an enterprise has a PE in the host country, it is then necessary to determine what, 
if any, are the profits that the host country may tax.21 The AOA to the attribution of 
profits to the PE is epitomized in the 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishment (2010 Report) and Article 7 of the OECD Model.22 The 
basic idea of the AOA is to hypothesize a PE as a separate and independent enterprise 
so that the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TP Guidelines)23 developed in connection 
with Article 9 of the Model Convention can be extended to the circumstance of PEs.24 
                                                        
16 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra n. 2, at 8 (para. 11). 
17 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, at 13 (paras 38, 39). 
18 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 13 (para. 50). 
19 OECD, Statement by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach to Address the 
Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra n. 2, at 8 (para.10), 16 (paras 56, 57). 
20 OECD Model Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 7, paras 1, 2.  
21 OECD Model Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 7, paras 1, 2. 
22 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (OECD Publishing 2010); 
OECD Model Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 7, paras 21-22. 
23 OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 
Publishing 2017). 
24 R. Couzin, The OECD Project: Transfer Pricing Meets Permanent Establishment, 53 Canadian Tax Journal 2, 
401, 402 (2005).  
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Specifically, the AOA recommends a two-step analysis in this regard.  
Step 1: Functional and factual analysis  
This first step aims to hypothesize the existence of a PE as a separate and independent 
enterprise since otherwise, in a legal sense, a PE is always an integral part of its 
headquarter enterprise. Essentially, the analysis delineates the ‘boundary’ of a PE – i.e. 
its rights and obligations, economic ownership of assets, attribution of risks, 
attribution of capital, etc. – by reference to significant people functions performed in 
the PE.25  
Step 2: Comparability analysis  
Under this step, the dealings of the PE will be compared to transactions of 
independent enterprises that have the same or similar characteristics in terms of, inter 
alia, functions, assets, and risks. In particular, the internal dealings between the PE 
and the other part of the non-resident enterprise will be examined on an arms’ length 
basis.26 
The AOA has been heavily criticized for its complexity. Indeed, the method “has not 
found many supporters, and has been rejected by a large group of countries”.27 Part of 
its complexity concerns Step 2, which involves the application of the Guidelines. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties of applying the Guidelines are common to all types of 
TP cases (although the PE context does complicate the situation further).28 In contrast, 
the most difficult part of the AOA relates to the first step that rests the boundary of a 
PE upon the concept of significant people function. It could be seen that the AOA 
together with Article 7 establish the physical presence, either being a fixed place or 
some significant people functions, as the foundation of nexus and profit allocation 
rules with respect to business income. This ‘brick-and-mortar’ approach is in 
accordance with the benefit principle underlying the PE regime, i.e. taxes should be 
paid where the business would typically avail itself to a significant degree of public 
goods provided by the state.29 However, as will be argued in the following section, 
                                                        
25 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 14-20 
(paras13-38); OECD Model Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 7, para. 21. 
26 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 20 (paras 39-43); 
OECD Model Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 7, para. 22. 
27 Oats, Miller & Mulligan, supra n. 6, at 264; Baker, supra n. 6, at 514.  
28 See OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 14 (para. 14); 
Couzin, supra n. 24, at 404-405. 
29 J. Becker & J. Englisch, Taxing Where Value Is Created: What’s ‘User Involvement’ Got to Do With It? 47 
Intertax 2, 161, 162 (2019); see also K. Holmes, International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An 
Introduction to Principles and Application 20-21 (2nd ed., IBFD 2014). 
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this conventional approach to profit allocation regarding business income and the 
narrowly construed benefit-principle are questionable even for the traditional fiscal 
world absence of digitalisation. The issue becomes particularly acute when the 
DAPE’s profit attribution is concerned.        
4. PROFIT ATTRIBUTION TO THE DAPE: INSIGHTS FROM THE UA 
4.1 Single-taxpayer vs. dual-taxpayer approach 
Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 5, if a non-resident enterprise carries on its business 
in a source state through a person situated in that state and that person acts as a 
dependent agent (DA) of the enterprise, then it is deemed that the enterprise has a PE, 
typically known as the DAPE, in the source state. It should be noted that, although the 
DA acts on behalf of and is contractually dependent on the principal, it is per se a 
separate enterprise conducting its own businesses with a view to profit.30 Therefore, 
the DA will be rewarded for the services it provides to the non-resident taxpayer, and 
the profit of the DA will be taxed by the source country. In this connection, some 
commentators contend that, in all circumstances, the payment of an arm’s length 
reward to the DA should fully extinguish the profit attributable to the DAPE.31 
Accordingly, the only taxpayer in the source country with respect to the cross-border 
business is the DA, which is usually a resident enterprise to the source country. This 
proposal is known as ‘the single-taxpayer approach’.32  
The flaw of the single-taxpayer approach is evident. Among others, this approach 
‘would mean that there would never be profit consequences resulting from the finding 
of a dependent agent PE, thereby making Article 5 (5) largely redundant’.33 In this 
connection, the AOA maintains that a DAPE is different from a DA. In addition to the 
reward to the DA, further profit may be attributable to the DAPE if the DA performs 
significant people functions relevant to the assumption of risks, the economic 
ownership of assets, etc.34 This method can be referred to as ‘the dual-taxpayer 
approach’. For example, if the DA performs significant people functions relevant to 
the development of a market intangible in the source country, then the economic 
ownership of the intangible will be attributed to the DAPE proportionally – though, 
                                                        
30 Holmes, supra n. 29, at 186. 
31 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 60 (para. 235). 
32 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22. 
33 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 61 (para. 239). 
For other criticisms of the single-taxpayer approach, see 61 (paras 236-238). 
34 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 60 (para. 232). 
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legally, all of the tangible or intangible assets will be owned by the non-resident 
enterprise – and profits associated with the intangible will accordingly be assigned to 
the DAPE. Likewise, as the 2010 Report provides, if the DA performs a significant 
people function relevant to the management of inventory risks, then the profit or loss 
associate with such risks – such as the appreciation or depreciation of the inventory 
value – will be attributable to the DAPE.35 It could be seen that the AOA maintains its 
consistency between the DAPE’s profit allocation and that of other PE types, both of 
which rely on the concept of the significant people function.   
Compared with the single-taxpayer approach, the dual-taxpayer approach represents a 
more effective option in preserving the integrity of the DAPE regime and enabling the 
source country to acquire a fairer slice of the tax cake related to cross-border business 
income. It is true that a DA would usually be rewarded for any extra people functions 
above baseline activities, such as its development of market intangibles. Nevertheless, 
this reward would typically be significantly less than the entire proceeds generated 
from such people functions. 
4.2 Deficiencies of the significant-people-function approach in profit attribution   
Despite the above advantages of the dual-taxpayer approach, its reliance on the 
significant people function is, at best, insufficient. The people function performed by 
a DA enterprise lies within a spectrum from baseline activities to full-fledged sales 
functions. Additionally, considering the typically arm’s-length relationship between 
the DA and its principal, any extra functions undertaken by the DA would be 
remunerated by the principal. However, under the AOA, it seems that certain points of 
people functions are so ‘significant’ that they would attribute a further portion of the 
principal’s profit to the source country. This ‘cliff’ effect in profit allocation can be 
illustrated in the following graph where the horizontal axis denotes the spectrum of 
the people function performed by a DA, and the vertical axis denotes profit level. The 
broken line illustrates the profit allocated to the source state under the AOA. It can be 
seen that the line makes a sudden leap at Point B. Before B, the only taxable income 
in the source state is the arm’s length reward to the DA whereas, after B, further profit 
of the non-resident taxpayer is allocated to the source state as the income of the 
DAPE. 
 
                                                        


















Given this ‘cliff’ effect on profit allocation, it becomes critical for the non-resident 
enterprise and the DA to prove that the function performed by the DA is insignificant. 
As a result, the identification of a significant people function, or the B point in the 
above graph, may become highly contentious. Imagine a DA person who is skillful in 
soliciting orders and negotiating contracts, who actively manages inventory level and 
sales credit, yet does not play a role in developing brand names and an overall market 
strategy for the non-resident enterprise. According to the AOA, it seems that the sales 
skill would only be allocated an arm’s length reward while the management of 
inventory and credit risks could be attributed some profit of the principal generated 
from these management activities. However, it is difficult to understand why 
managing inventory and credit risks are more significant in the profit allocation than 
soliciting orders and negotiating contracts which are at the core of the business. In 





addition, it could be difficult, if not impossible, for taxpayers and tax administrations 
to foresee all of the types of significant people functions that may vary from business 
to business. Complexity may also arise for parties to compute profit attributable to 
each type of significant people functions. For example, how much of the profit should 
be allocated to a significant people function related to the assumption of credit risk? 
Last but not least, although the significant-people-function approach can be traced 
back to the benefit principle, as was discussed in section 3, the application of this 
approach to the DAPE situation may indeed contradict the benefit principle. This is 
because all of the people functions performed in the source country, significant or 
insignificant, are undertaken by the DA rather than the non-resident enterprise. 
Accordingly, if the source state has provided any benefits of public goods in relation 
to the business income concerned, they are physically consumed by the DA enterprise 
which is typically a resident in the source state. Therefore, it seems the source state is 
only entitled to tax the income of the DA enterprise.         
The problem of the AOA becomes particularly acute regarding a PE of simple 
functions. As the 2010 Report recognizes, a DA may not perform any significant 
people function that is relevant to the economic ownership of assets and/or the 
management of risks. In that case, ‘profits to the dependent agent PE is 
correspondingly reduced or eliminated’. An example provided by the report is a mere 
sales agent that ‘may well be unlikely to represent the significant people function’.36 
It seems that the AOA returns to the single-taxpayer approach to profit allocation in 
the situation of simple-function PEs. The problem, however, is that simple-function 
PEs such as mere sales agents constitute the most typical DA type. Indeed, one of the 
most critical yardsticks in distinguishing the DA from an independent agent, which 
will not give rise to a DAPE, is that an independent agent bears a commercial degree 
of entrepreneurial risks whereas a DA complies with detailed instructions from the 
non-resident enterprise.37 If no further profit – in addition to the reward to the DA 
enterprise – would be attributed to such DAPEs with insignificant functions, then 
perhaps a significant part of the DAPE regime will be rendered meaningless. 
The above problem related to simple-function DAs can also be viewed in the context 
of a sales commissionaire arrangement. A commissionaire company is usually a 
subsidiary that performs a very limited range of business functions, bears only 
                                                        
36 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 60 (para. 233). 
37 Oats, Miller & Mulligan, supra n. 6, at 247-248. 
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minimal risks, and owns few assets.38 In the case of a sales commissionaire, the 
business risk is borne by the associated supplier company rather than the 
commissionaire, and the function of the commissionaire is limited to pure sales. 
Accordingly, the commissionaire only earns a commission fee for the distribution 
service rather than the profit from the sale. With such commissionaire arrangements, 
an MNE manages to minimize the amount of group profit that must be allocated to the 
commission that is typically located in a high-tax jurisdiction.39 One way of tackling 
this tax planning method is to deem a sales commissionaire as a DAPE of the 
non-resident supplier company so that further profit in addition to the commission fee 
could be allocated to the source country.40 However, this anti-avoidance measure 
would largely be nullified, or at least made less effective, by the 
significant-people-function approach because a critical feature of a sales 
commissionaire is its limited people function compared with a full-fledged distributor.  
4.3 Applying the new taxing right to the DAPE 
Considering the shortcomings of the AOA in fulfilling the dual-taxpayer approach to 
the profit attribution regarding the DAPE, the question remains on what grounds 
further profit of the non-resident enterprise can be attributed to the DAPE in addition 
to the arm’s length reward paid to the DA. In this regard, the UA provides a simpler 
and better option: the DAPE would be further allocated a sum equivalent to Amount A, 
i.e. part or all of the residual profit earned by the non-resident enterprise from the 
business in question. Amount A will be a constant percentage – 100% or less – of the 
residual profit regardless of the magnitude of the people function performed by the 
DA. Accordingly, any people function, significant or routine, that is performed by the 
DA will be covered by the arm’s length reward to the DA. This reward is actually 
equivalent to the aggregation of Amounts B and C or only Amount B if the DA only 
undertakes baseline activities. Indeed, the DAPE presents a perfect situation in which 
Amount A will never be overlapped with Amounts B and C because any B and C will 
automatically be covered in the reward to the DA and will be deducted as an expense 
from the income of the enterprise in deriving Amount A attributable to the DAPE. The 
UA approach to the DAPE’s profit attribution can be depicted in the following graph: 
   
                                                        
38 Oats, Miller & Mulligan, supra n. 6, at 248. 
39 Oats, Miller & Mulligan, supra n. 6, at 249. 
40 OECD, OECD Model Tax Convention: Revised Proposals Concerning the Interpretation and Application of 






















Compared with Graph 1, the cliff effect of the profit level allocated to the source 
country has been settled as the profit attributable to the DAPE – denoted by the gap 
between line 1 and line2 – becomes a constant value, which is Amount A. In this way, 
the dual-taxpayer approach can be maintained while, at the same time, the 
shortcomings related to the reliance on the significant people function can largely be 
avoided.  
Line 1：profit allocated to the source state 
People function 
Profit 
Line 2：arm’s length reward to the DA 
 Profit attributable to DAPE 
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Going forward, the UA can be extended to fixed-place sales PEs. Specifically, the 
people function of the PE will be covered by Amount B or the sum of B and C, 
depending on whether the PE performs any non-routine activities. Independent of 
such rewards of people functions, the PE will be further attributed a profit equivalent 
to Amount A. Otherwise, the AOA to the profit allocation regarding fixed-place PE 
would face the same challenges as with the DAPE: the cliff effect of profit allocation, 
the difficulty of distinguishing significant people functions from those that are 
insignificant, and the complexity of matching profit to any particular type of people 
function.  
Indeed, the taxing rights of market jurisdictions have been touched upon lightly in the 
2010 Report. In the discussion regarding the attribution of assets to the PE, the report 
warns that the process also depends upon the type of asset and the type of business for 
which the asset is used.41 For example, the fact that a PE economically owns a 
tangible asset that is used in a manufacturing process does not necessarily mean that 
this asset can be attributed income from selling goods even though the goods are 
manufactured by the asset.42 With this statement, the report actually admits that the 
factor of significant people function alone is insufficient for determining the profit 
attributable to the PE and that reference must also be made to the type of the PE – 
whether or not it is a sales branch. The 2010 Report does not further explain why 
sales activities are so unique compared with manufacturing processes. A speculation is 
that, had the drafters of the report elaborated on this point further, they might have 
developed a different path that is more in accordance with the UA.  
It might have been noticed that a fixed-place sales PE located in market jurisdictions 
is indeed a typical scenario covered in the UA in which Amounts B and C cover the 
physical presences – including fixed-place PEs – of MNEs in market jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the UA only applies to in-scope businesses and is subject to nexus 
threshold whereas other business types remain being covered by the AOA. In this 
sense, the above argument also demonstrated that, at least for MNEs having physical 
sales presences in marketing jurisdictions, the UA’s differentiation between in-scope 
business and out-of-scope business leads to nothing but unnecessary inconsistency.     
By far, two questions remain unanswered regarding the UA to the PE’s profit 
attribution. The first question concerns the policy rationale of the proposal, which will 
                                                        
41 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22, at 16 (para. 19). 
42 OECD, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, supra n. 22. 
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be addressed in this paragraph; and the second pertains to the quantum of Amount A, 
which will be covered in the next section in conjunction with a case study. The issue 
of policy rationale becomes particularly prominent when the situation of 
simple-function DA is concerned: given that the significant people function in relation 
to the business has been performed by the non-resident enterprise outside the source 
state, why should some or all of the residual profit be allocated to that source state? 
The question can be enlightened by the marketing intangibles proposal and the 
significant economic presence proposal. According to the marketing intangibles 
theory, there is an intrinsic link between the market-related people function, 
regardless of its performing place, and the source jurisdiction. For example, some 
marketing intangibles, such as brand and trade name, ‘are reflected in the favourable 
attitudes in the minds of customers’.43 Based on the significant economic presence 
theory, it could be said that the significant people function performed by the 
non-resident enterprise has been projected to the source country via the channel of the 
DA. In this way, the non-resident enterprise has projected a significant economic 
presence in the source country.44 Both accounts can be incorporated into a benefit 
narrative: market-related people functions benefit from the customer bases of the 
source jurisdiction. In this context, the traditional benefit principle needs to be 
expanded to encompass not just physical utilities such as infrastructure and public 
service but also customer bases of the source country.45 The difference between this 
expanded version of benefit principle and the traditional version is qualitative rather 
than merely quantitative. Specifically, unlike those physical benefits that necessitate 
some geographical proximity between a beneficiary (an enterprise) and a service 
provider (the host country), market benefits can be exploited remotely. It is this 
expanded benefit principle that justifies the new taxing rights allocated to market 
jurisdictions irrespective of the existence of physical presence.   
4.4 ANALYSIS OF THE SET SATELLITE CASE 
This Indian case involves a Singapore company, SET Satellite, that conducted 
advertising businesses in India through its DA, SET Satellite India. The tax return of 
the Singapore company showed that it had no tax liability in India as the DA was 
                                                        
43 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, Public Consultation Document 13 
Feb. 2019 – 6 March 2019, 12 (paras 30-31) (OECD Publishing February 2019). 
44 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra n. 43, at 16 (paras 50, 51). 
45 A. J. Cockfield, Reforming the Permanent Establishment Principle Through a Quantitative Economic Presence 
Test, 38 Can. Bus. LJ 400, 403 (2003). 
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already remunerated on an arm’s length basis. The position was challenged by the 
Indian tax authority, and an appeal was made to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 
(ITAT) of Mumbai.46 The case concerned the debate about the choice between the 
single-taxpayer and dual-taxpayer approaches. 
The ITAT supported the dual-taxpayer approach, arguing that the alternative option 
would render the entire concept of DAPE meaningless.47 The ITAT particularly 
opined that the profit attributable to the DAPE should be decided on the basis of the 
foreign company’s revenue from the business performed in the source state through 
the DA. To illustrate this point, the tribunal provided an imaginary case as follows:48 
Sing Co is an electronic equipment distributor based in Singapore. It sources 
electronic equipment from all over the globe and sells the same to the Indian market 
through a local DA called Ind Co. The consideration received by Ind Co is agreed to 
be 30 per cent on sales plus reimbursement of expenses. Sing Co procures electronic 
equipment from China, ships the products directly to India and sells them in India 
after a mark up of 200 per cent. The handling costs of Sing Co for souring the 
merchandise are 60 per cent on cost. In a particular year, Sing Co sells goods worth 
USD 3 million in India. Ind Co incurs a cost of USD 899,000 to earn the agency 
remuneration. 
The tribunal computed the profits that are taxable in India as follows: 
Dependant agent’s income:  
Commission earned                       $ 9,00,000  
Less: Deductible expenses incurred           ($ 8,99,000)  
Taxable income                           $ 1,000  
  
DAPE’s income:  
Sales consideration                         $ 30,00,000  
Less: Agent’s commission                    ($ 9,00,000)  
Less: Cost of purchase                       ($ 10,00,000)  
Less: Handling charges                       ($ 6,00,000)  
Attributable profits                          $ 5,00,000  
                                                        
46 IN: Deputy Director of Income-Tax vs. Set Satellite (Singapore), 2007 106 ITD 175 Mum (2007). 
47 Deputy Director of Income-Tax vs. Set Satellite (Singapore), supra n. 46, at para. 31. 
48 Deputy Director of Income-Tax vs. Set Satellite (Singapore), supra n. 46, at para. 11. 
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The tribunal noted that there was a prominent difference between the DA’s income 
and the DAPE’s income, both of which were subject to the source tax.  
This example not only demonstrates the difference in profit allocation between the 
single-taxpayer and the dual-taxpayer approaches but also elucidates Amount A. First, 
the tribunal attributed almost all of the profit of Sing Co in relation to the business in 
India to the DAPE and hence little has been left to the Singapore company. This 
computation is somehow problematic since Sing Co performs, at the very least, some 
baseline activities such as the procurement and handling of the goods. Nevertheless, 
even if such baseline activities are attributed an arm’s length remuneration, the 
residual income would still be allocated to the DAPE by the tribunal. Consequently, 
Amount A in the above example constitutes 100 per cent of the residual income in 
relation to the business. To be sure, the fact of the imaginary case seems to suggest 
that Ind Co is a full-fledged sales agent whereas Sing Co only undertakes routine 
activities. Nevertheless, nowhere in the judgment did the tribunal make any reference 
of the significant people function in determining the profit attributable to the DAPE. 
This confirms the point that a market jurisdiction is entitled to a tax right for its own 
sake. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that, even if Sing Co performs significant 
people functions in carrying on the business, such functions would only be attributed 
an arm’s length reward that is somehow equivalent to Amounts B and C while the 
residual income would still be allocated to the destination country. This 
destination-based approach is in accordance with the expanded benefit principle 
enunciated in Section 4.3: people functions that target a market jurisdiction should be 
regarded as having benefited from that jurisdiction even if such functions are 
performed outside the jurisdiction.49    
Secondly, in deriving the profit attributable to the DAPE, the tribunal did not focus on 
the DAPE directly but began from the total revenue of the non-resident enterprise 
from the business. The revenue was then subtracted by the cost of the non-resident 
enterprise in relation to the business, including the remuneration to the DA enterprise. 
This indirect approach is most beneficial when a fixed place PE performing 
full-fledged sales functions is concerned. For such PEs, not only Amount A but also B 
and C are all difficult to determine considering their performance of non-routine 
activities. In contrast, under the indirect approach, once the costs of and the 
                                                        
49 For the link between the taxing rights of market jurisdictions and a destination-based transfer pricing method, 
see Brauner, supra n. 8, at 272. 
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remuneration for the activities of the non-resident enterprise are determined, the 
aggregation of amounts A, B, and C that are attributable to the PE can automatically 
be derived. There is no need to further isolate each of the three amounts since all three 
together constitute the taxable income of the fixed-place PE payable to the source 
country. 
It is true that the tribunal’s position in the SET Satellite case has not been universally 
accepted. Indeed, the case was then appealed before the Bombay High Court, which 
subsequently set aside the ITAT’s decision.50 Nevertheless, the ITAT’s position has 
increasingly been defended by scholars.51         
5. COMMENTS ON THE UA: INSIGHTS FROM THE SET SATELLITE 
CASE 
Despite the UA’s merit in protecting the fiscal interests of market jurisdictions in the 
context of digitalisation and its advantages in addressing the issue of attributing profit 
to sales PEs, the approach is not free from challenge. Like the AOA, one major 
criticism of the UA concerns its complexity.52 In these authors’ view, much of this 
complexity is related to the UA’s hybrid feature: while it was originated to address the 
tax challenge of scale without mass, it also covers the traditional situation where 
MNEs have physical presences in market jurisdictions, and the latter situation has 
traditionally been covered by the conventional TP rules. It is true that the UA is 
essentially a variant of the profit-split method.53 However, profit split is only one, and 
usually the last, resort of TP methods. Imagine the following example which is 
adapted from an example provided in the consultation document on UA.54 
P Co, resident in Country 1, is the parent company of Group X, which manufactures a 
type of widgets. Q Co, a subsidiary of P Co, resident in Country 2, plays a pivotal role 
in developing market intangibles in relation to the widgets. Q Co sells products to 
customers in Country 2. It has also begun selling products remotely to customers in 
Country 3 where it does not have any taxable presence under the current rules. 
For the sales in Country 2 where Q Co, a full-fledge distributor subsidiary, is located, 
                                                        
50 IN: SET Satellite (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. DDIT (2008-TIOL-414-HC-MUM-IT). 
51 R. Sharma, Attribution of Profits to a Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment: An Analysis of the Indian 
Approach, 37 Intertax 8/9, 493 (2009). 
52 Dourado, supra n. 8; M. F. de Wilde, On the OECD’s ‘Unified Approach’ as Frankenstein’s Monster and a 
Dented Shape Sorter, 48 Intertax 1, 9 (2020). 
53 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 13 (para. 52). 
54 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ under Pillar One, supra n. 1, at 11 (para. 41). 
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it seems the most straightforward way of allocating profits among associated 
companies is to apply the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) of the widget. In 
particular, if it is found that P Co’s function is more routine, the CUP would ensure 
that P Co is attributed no more than an arm’s length reward for its manufacturing 
activities. Accordingly, most of the residual income will be allocated to Q Co. It is 
true that a direct CUP is usually difficult to find and hence a profit-oriented method 
would be a more practical alternative. Nevertheless, as was discussed in the above 
case study (Section 4.4), a profit-based method could start with P Co, or the supply 
side of the business, rather than with Q Co. Again, if P Co only performs routine 
activities, the use of the profit-based method beginning with P Co, such as the 
cost-based transactional net margin method (TNMM), would also allocate full 
residual income to Q Co.55 The profit method based on the supply side also promotes 
administrative efficiency, particularly when the supply side performs functions that 
are more routine. This is because once the arm’s length remuneration for P Co is 
calculated, the profit attributable to Q Co, including Amounts A, B, and C, will 
automatically be determined. By contrast, working on Amounts A, B, and C directly, 
as is shown in the UA, may lead to repeated efforts and double counting. Repetition 
means administration inefficiency, and double counting implies disputes. The 
separation between A and C could be particularly controversial as both ‘eat into’ the 
profit above the remuneration for baseline activities. Indeed, the fact that the UA also 
features a notable emphasis on strengthened dispute prevention/resolution 
mechanisms may suggest the inherent volatility of the approach.   
These authors do not necessarily deny the benefits of the UA. Indeed, two scenarios 
of profit attribution could be particularly amenable to the approach. The first is the 
scale without mass, such as the sale in Country 3 in the above example. Since this 
situation only involves Amount A allocated to the source country, the UA could be the 
most straightforward method to apply. The second scenario is when the supply side of 
an MNE, e.g. P Co in the above example, also engages in significant non-routine 
activities. In this situation, even the traditional TP regime would recommend the 
profit-split method as the most appropriate option.56 Nevertheless, the authors cannot 
see any solid grounds to confine the method of profit allocation regarding a sales 
                                                        
55 The TNMM examines the net profit relative to an appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) realized by the 
taxpayer from a controlled transaction; see OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, supra n. 23, at 117-132. 
56 OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, supra n. 23, 
at 133-134. 
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presence – be it a subsidiary or a PE – to the UA instead of allowing the parties a 
margin of freedom to employ a wider array of TP tools. As is discussed in the case 
study in section 4.5, the fiscal interests of market jurisdictions can be well entertained 
by the conventional TP rules even with respect to the DAPE where the MNE does not 
have any physical presence of its own in the source country. It is true that, for 
situations where significant people functions are all performed at the supply side, 
conventional TP rules may lead to too much profit being allocated to the supply side 
instead of the market jurisdiction; thereby appearing less attractive than the UA. 
However, even in such cases, Amount A for market jurisdictions can still be preserved 
by making the TP rule more destination-based, at least with respect to those 
market-related functions.  
Therefore, these authors submit that the UA can take a more general and flexible form; 
it only needs to articulate the basic principle that market jurisdictions should be 
allocated at least a portion of residual income from cross-border businesses 
irrespective of the existence of any taxable presence in those jurisdictions. This goal 
can largely be achieved through conventional TP rules although, where significant 
market-related people functions are performed outside a market jurisdiction, some 
destination-based TP rules are more desirable. Only if and when parties are unable to 
attain any satisfactory result through usual TP methods should the three-tier profit 
allocation mechanism (i.e. Amounts A, B and C) currently endorsed in the UA serve 
as the last resort.       
6. CONCLUSION 
Digitalisation of the economy leads to the prevalence of scale without mass which 
subsequently poses challenges to the international tax regime, particularly with 
respect to nexus and profit allocation rules over business income. The UA addresses 
these challenges by conferring new taxing rights to market jurisdictions irrespective 
of the existence of any ‘mass’. This article noted that, even before the era of 
digitalisation, scale without mass and the resulting tax nuisances had already been 
manifested in the situation of the DAPE where a non-resident taxpayer has no 
physical presence of its own in the market jurisdiction. Considering that all of the 
people functions performed by the DA are remunerated at an arm’s length price and 
all other people functions are performed outside the market jurisdiction, the question 
remains on what basis a DAPE should be attributed further profit of the non-resident 
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enterprise. The AOA hinges the profit attributable to a DAPE on the significant people 
function undertaken by the DA, an approach attracting much criticism. Drawing on 
the UA, the authors argued that what is attributable to a DAPE is indeed the residual 
income of the business concerned, i.e. Amount A under the UA. Going forward, the 
UA can apply to not only DAPEs but also fixed-place sales PEs. At the same time, 
some domestic practice on the DAPE’s profit attribution may also shed useful light on 
the refinement of the UA. In particular, for the situation where there is a marketing 
and distributing presence in the market jurisdiction, conventional TP rules with some 
destination-based modification can achieve the same goal of ensuring tax concession 
to market jurisdictions. Therefore, it is recommended that the UA take a more flexible 
approach rather than restricting itself to the three-tier profit allocation mechanism.        
